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The figure of ‘the Other’ has loomed large in Anglo-American critical theory since 
the late 1980s; the imperative to acknowledge and preserve alterity in all its forms has 
come to inform every single discourse in the humanities and social sciences. In Peter 
Hallward’s sceptical formulation, ‘Perhaps nothing is more orthodox today than a 
generalized reverence for the other qua other.’1 This critical obsession with the Other 
has a dual origin. First, Hegel’s dialectic of the master/slave in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit—mediated through myriad readings in mid-twentieth-century France—plays a 
dominant role in contemporary understandings of intersubjective relations.
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 Second, 
critical theory has been galvanized by Levinas’ rebellion against a Hellenic ontology 
of the Same in favour of a Hebraic ethics of the Other: the subject is, before anything 
else, summoned by the Other and so responsible for the Other. Repeated (with 
variation) in the work of Derrida, Spivak, Irigaray and many others, the priority of the 
Other and the resultant theory of difference it generates are now central to theoretical 
concerns. These concerns have, moreover, fitted snugly with theology’s pre-existing 
interest in transcendence. The infinite qualitative difference of God from the world is 
read as a traditional synonym for otherness.
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 In consequence, the critical theory of the 
last two decades found an ally in the theological tradition—both its ways of 
conceptualising transcendence and also its means of articulating it, whether apophatic 
or analogic. 
And yet, the figure of the Other has increasingly come under attack. In the 
wake of Derrida’s death, a new critical idiom has surfaced which is far less keen on 
acknowledging alterity. The popularity of Deleuze, Badiou and ‘the speculative turn’ 
has given rise to a new concern for immanence at the expense of alterity.
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 Emblematic 
is Badiou’s claim, ‘The whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other 
must be purely and simply abandoned. For the real question—and it is an 
extraordinarily difficult one—is much more that of recognising the same.’5 Badiou 
advocates an ethics that would be ‘indifferent to differences’6, that would galvanise 
subjects in the name of a collective, revolutionary truth. In consequence, for Badiou, 
ethics is precisely that which does away with the Other. 
This new attitude has begun to seep into critical theory: two examples 
(Hallward in postcolonialism and Le Doeuff in feminism) are illustrative. Hallward’s 
postcolonial theory is premised on the claim that Anglo-American critical theory has 
systematically misread French philosophy as proposing philosophies of difference 
governed by the figure of the Other, instead of (what is actually the case) philosophies 
of the singular without others.
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 Hence, ‘the most precious sacred cow of 
contemporary philosophy—the other’8 is in fact a fiction based on a misreading of 
critical theory’s sources. Deleuze, not Levinas, becomes emblematic of the structure 
of the subject, for Deleuze’s philosophy moves into ‘those regions where the Other-
structure no longer functions.’9 What is more, the Other is not just a fiction, it is a 
pernicious fiction. This is because there are two pathways open to a postcolonialism 
of alterity and both lead theorists awry. First, the theorist can merely designate a 
group as purely, intrinsically Other—independently of any specific characteristics. 
This, however, is both a dangerous abstraction and also a failure to discern any 
concrete differences at all. This invocation of the bare Other ends in homogeneity, 
precisely what a philosophy of difference hoped to avoid. The second path leads 
towards an endlessly proliferating recognition of concrete differences. This too, 
however, is problematic. Hallward writes, 
 
If the heyday of ‘fully’ postmodern readings—that is, readings explicitly 
allied to the postmodernity preached by Lyotard and Baudrillard—appears by 
now to have come and gone, it is because such readings have had real trouble 
meeting the challenge posed by this call to particularization. Pure 
contingency, incommensurability or fragmentation do not lend themselves to 
anything but an ad hoc specification.
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In other words, to theorise the particular as absolutely particular is to achieve nothing 
but pointing
11—that is, ‘ad hoc specification’ or a list of empirical properties. Theory 
breaks down:  
 
The supremely theoretical bias of what might be called ‘high postmodernism’ 
has, in critical practice, converged almost to the point of indistinction with 
what was once the explicitly anti-theoretical bias of empiricism [and] 
pragmatism.
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It is for such reasons that Hallward abandons the Other in the name of a postcolonial 
theory of singularity.
13
 
 While Michèle Le Doeuff is not directly influenced by recent trends in French 
philosophy to the same extent as Hallward, her work self-consciously resonates with 
that of Deleuze and her increasing visibility in Anglo-American feminism is in part 
due to these changing fashions.
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 Ever since her 1980 The Philosophical Imaginary, 
Le Doeuff has been trenchantly critical of appeals to the Other. They are, she suggests 
in that work, a mere foil for the superiority of what is considered ‘the Same’ 
(philosophy, rationality, masculinity).
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 In Hipparchia’s Choice, Le Doeuff applies 
such criticisms to feminisms of difference in particular. To define women as the Other 
is to advocate an abstract difference between man and woman at the expense of the 
differences that exist between particular women and the differences that sometimes do 
not exist between particular men and particular women: 
 
To look for a language in which ‘women can speak their sex’ is, in fact, to 
reduce this diversity [between women] to a sameness, to speak in terms of a 
single femininity… Unsurprisingly [such language] led to a return to pre-
1940s fashions, crocheting, jam-making and motherhood considered as a fine 
art. One may like jam and knitting and think that motherhood is indeed only 
justifiable if it can become one of the fine arts, but it is a big step from there 
to accepting even for a moment that every woman should conform to this 
model. And then many men have started to enjoy devoting part of their lives 
to jam or children: to want this type of ‘difference’ would mean forbidding 
them these choices.
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As Le Doeuff continues, this is not just a problem for feminism, but for all theories of 
the Other:  
 
The ideology of difference… arises from a contradiction. It starts by 
assuming that the existence of difference is valued, but then, by concentrating 
on one particular difference, it turns against its original programme, 
suppressing all differences which might exist on either side of the great 
dividing line [between same and other] which it has drawn. The only 
consistent way to give value to the fact of difference is to uncover differences 
by their thousands.
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Le Doeuff looks to Simone de Beauvoir as a means of overcoming the hegemony of 
the Other: Beauvoir’s commitment both to ‘the ideal of reciprocity’18 (where mutual 
recognition is a fact to be presupposed and not, as in Hegel, an ideal to strive violently 
for) and also to a thinking ‘tied to the factual’ meant she ‘pluralized’ and ultimately 
‘undermined’ the category of the Other.19  
 
 If such are the current critiques of the Other gaining ground within critical 
theory, what are the implications for theology? The problem is stark: unlike many 
other discourses, theologies are committed to the concept of the Other; there are no 
positive religions which are able to completely give up on transcendence. For 
orthodox theology, absolute immanence is not an option.
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 Hence, theology cannot 
follow prevailing trends as painlessly as other disciplines in the humanities. The result 
is (or should be), I contend, a fruitful one: instead of a paradigm shift, here emerges a 
fault line across which immanence and theology rub uneasily against each other. In 
short, this state of affairs should give rise to a mutual interrogation—immanence 
becomes a critical tool to sound out invocations of the Other, and vice versa. 
 What is needed then is renewed attention to concrete and specific ways in 
which alterity is produced, but also concealed and exploited—and this is something 
only possible after Levinas, after Derrida, after the speculative turn. It involves, 
above all, paying attention to particular texts (and, in particular, literary texts) which 
represent the Other differently. A history of the representation of others is now 
possible. It should be a history, since the search for alternative dialectics of 
same/other will involve reading texts outside of the Hegelian or Levinasian tradition 
by, for example, returning to earlier historical periods. It should be a history of others, 
since this search for alternatives will transform the bare, monolithic Other into a 
plurality of diverse but concrete others. 
 Crucial then to the prospects for a theology of the Other after the turn to 
immanence is critique and, more specifically, critical attention. A history of the 
representation of others is only possible through careful and sustained focus on the 
particularities and singularities of the same/other relation as it is played out in specific 
texts in history. This focus is what Goethe invoked with the phrase ‘delicate 
empiricism’21; it is what Raimond Gaita has recently called a method that ‘leads us 
towards reality’22; it is also the central concept in a tradition of ascetic realism that 
passes through Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. Murdoch defines attention as ‘a just 
and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality… the characteristic and proper 
mark of the active moral agent.’23 When one’s vision is disciplined by both ‘moral 
imagination and moral effort’24, then one is able to dispel illusion and distortion for 
the sake of clearly seeing things as they are. Attention is ‘obedience to reality’25—and 
it is what is required to overcome abstractions, like the bare Other, in the name of a 
history of concrete, particular others.
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 Hence, the title of this special issue: Attending 
to Others. 
 
* * * 
 
The following essays were first presented at the fifteenth biennial conference of the 
International Society of Religion, Literature and Culture held at St Catherine’s 
College, University of Oxford, between 23
rd
 and 26
th
 September 2010 under the title, 
‘Attending to the Other: Critical Theory and Spiritual Practice.’27 The subtitle 
indicates precisely the uneasy relation between current critical attitudes to the Other 
and religious discourse outlined above. A wide range of papers were given in nineteen 
different panels; this special issue represents a selection from the sessions devoted to 
Critical Theory, German Idealism, Judaism, Literature, Postcolonial Theory and 
Visual Arts. The six papers that follow have very differing concerns, and their authors 
may not fully agree with the project of a history of the representation of others that I, 
as guest editor, have presented above. It is a difficult, and often contrived, task to find 
coherence across such a vast plane of difference. But then, as conference co-
organiser, it was clear from the outset what we hoped the conference might achieve in 
re-thinking notions of Otherness. And thus, I have purposely selected all six papers 
because, in my view, they were outstanding examples of how we might rethink 
otherness—that is, reappraise the representation of others in religious and literary 
texts in the wake of increasing critique of the figure of the Other. 
 The issue begins with essays exploring alternative readings of two canonical 
figures at the heart of recent discourse about the Other. First, Aaron Rosen reads 
Levinas ‘against the grain’ by setting his more appreciative comments on individual 
works of art against his hostility to visual art in general (or at least, on Rosen’s 
reading, to some tendencies of it). The result is an account of an interfaith hospitality 
towards works of visual art which parallels the recent movements towards interfaith 
study of scripture. Andrew Hass then turns to the second major source for 
contemporary interest in same/other relations, Hegel’s master/slave dialectic. Hass 
points specifically to the significance of Hegel’s language of poiesis, bringing out the 
richness of a heterodox Hegelian vision of the artist. The artist negates herself as an 
other and negates the other as herself. 
 The next two essays return to the early modern period to unearth alternative 
conceptions of the same/other relation. Jayme Yeo examines the mix of mysticism 
and politics in the poetry of Richard Crashaw in order to show up how the resultant 
discourse of alterity both resembles and diverges from contemporary critical concern. 
Crashaw exemplifies a different logic of the Other by rigorously thinking through the 
consequences of mutual suffering. Jacqueline Cowan’s study of Bacon’s New Atlantis 
again recovers a different attitude to alterity in early modernity. She traces the 
dependence of utopian texts (like Bacon’s) on New World travel writing, marvelling 
at the otherness of recently discovered land. Bacon mimics the latter’s ‘rhetoric of 
marvels’, but in the name of a future ideal which will one day be assimilated. Alterity 
is posited only to be neutralised—and here Cowan puts her finger on a crucial 
temporal aspect of this representation of others. 
 The final two essays end the issue by problematising aspects of contemporary 
discourse about the Other. Marianne Schleicher interrogates the legitimacy of turning 
the Other into a site of subversion. Focusing in particular on the treatment of sexually 
ambiguous individuals in Jewish scripture, she meticulously charts the effects of 
various uses of these Scriptural figures on the inclusion and exclusion of readers. 
Finally, Ben Morgan initiates a dialogue with Toril Moi’s advocacy of the ‘adventure 
of reading’28 by launching a critique of the Other as such. He uses the findings of 
philosophy, psychology and literary texts to argue that it is ethically unhelpful and 
factually mistaken to articulate intersubjective relations through the categories of 
‘same’ and ‘Other’. In so doing, he implicitly lays the groundwork for new 
theological projects that will presuppose a community of collaborators, rather than a 
deadly struggle of combatants. 
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